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Child disability, welfare payments, marital status 
and mothers’ labor supply: Evidence from Australia
 Zeng-Hua Lu1* and Alec Zuo2
Abstract: This paper studies the effects of child disability on mothers’ participation in 
the labor force using Australian data. We formulate a bivariate Probit model in which 
mothers’ employment and welfare recipient status are treated as the dependent 
variables and child disability is responsible for the both dependent variables. Several 
propositions concerning the impacts of child disability on Australian mothers’ 
participation in the labor force are tested. Our testing procedure involves one-sided 
restrictions under the null or alternative hypotheses. Our main findings are as 
follows. A more severe child disability imposes greater restrictions on single mothers’ 
participation in the labor force. Single mothers are less likely than mothers with a 
partner to participate in the labor force in the event of a child health shock. There is 
some evidence of the disincentive effect of welfare payments in encouraging 
mothers’ participation in the labor force, particularly for single mothers.
Subjects: Multivariate Statistics; Employment & Unemployment; Econometrics
Keywords: child disability; extended MaxT test; female labor supply; one-sided test
1. Introduction
The relationship between child rearing and parental economic behavior has long attracted econo-
mists’ attention. Child health is an important aspect of child rearing that has close bearings on paren-
tal economic behavior (see, e.g. Condliffe & Link, 2008; Currie, 2000, 2009). Because the mother in a 
household usually assumes the primary responsibility for the care of children, the impact of a child’s 
disability on the mother’s labor supply has been a subject of research over the past two decades or so 
(see surveys by, e.g. Frijters, Johnston, Shah, & Shields, 2009; Lu & Zuo, 2010; Powers, 2003).
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Mothers in different family structures may react differently when they are presented with a disa-
bled child. In single parent families the mother may struggle with the roles of primary care-giver and 
sole income earner. Mothers in dual parent families may be able to stay at home to look after their 
disabled child because of financial support from their partners, or they may be able to continue their 
work as their partners share in the care of the health-impaired child. Whether there exists a different 
impact of child disability on a single mother and a mother with a partner is of policy interest. If family 
structure plays an important role on the impacts of child disability on mothers’ labor market activi-
ties, government policy could help provide better support to affected families by reflecting on family 
structure.
Government assistance, including financial support to affected families, is important for several 
reasons. For example, research has found that income has an impact on child health; children from 
poor families are more likely to experience a health problem or an exacerbation of a health problem 
than children from wealthy families (see, e.g. Case, Lubotsky, & Paxson, 2002; Condliffe & Link, 2008; 
Currie & Stabile, 2003). Also, the loss of income from paid work due to the presence of a disabled 
child could put the affected family at risk of persistent generational poverty (see, e.g. Currie, 2009; 
Powers, 2001, 2003). However, the public expenditure associated with welfare payments in many 
developed countries remains historically high (see, e.g. Klein, 2014). This inevitably puts pressure on 
a government’s budget. Furthermore, the disincentive of welfare payments together with the alarm-
ing fact that more single mothers than mothers with a partner occupy the list of welfare recipients 
have increasingly attracted the attention of policy makers and economists (see, e.g. Moffitt, 1992). 
Such concerns have been an important driver of welfare reform in the modern era. In Australia the 
Federal Government introduced the Work for the Dole Act in 1997 for the first time in Australian his-
tory. This development raises important questions such as how mothers’ labor market activities re-
spond to child disability taking into account the influence of government welfare payments; whether 
a more severe child disability imposes more restrictions on the mother’s labor supply; and to what 
extent, if any, does a differential effect of child disability exist between a single mother and a mother 
with a partner since they are likely to have different government welfare entitlements. This paper 
attempts to examine issues using Australian data.
The disincentive effect of welfare payments on the labor supply of mothers with a disabled child 
has been recognized by many authors (see, e.g. Corman, Noonan, & Reichman, 2005; Gould, 2004; 
Powers, 2001, 2003; Wolfe & Hill, 1995). Nevertheless, existing studies model the disincentive effect 
of welfare payments through the inclusion of a welfare variable as an exogenous regressor in single-
equation models. In this paper we adopt bivariate probit (BiProbit) models which allow us to model 
the conditional effect of welfare payments on the labor supply of mothers with a disable child. Since 
its introduction by Heckman (1978) BiProbit models have been a popular choice in applied research 
(see, e.g. Bhattacharya, Goldman, & McCaffrey, 2006; Evans & Schwab, 1995; Goldman et al., 2001; 
Neal, 1997). Bhattacharya et al. (2006) show some evidence on the favorable performance of BiProbit 
models against some two-step estimators.
Past studies suggest that child disability can have negative impacts on mothers’ labor supply (see, 
e.g. Breslau, Salkever, & Staruch, 1982; Corman et al., 2005; Frijters et al., 2009; Kimmel, 1997, 1998; 
Porterfield, 2002; Powers, 2001, 2003; Salkever, 1982; Zimmer, 2007). However, evidence concerning 
the differential effect of child disability between single mothers and mothers with a partner is incon-
clusive. Wolfe and Hill (1995) and Lu and Zuo (2010) argue that partnered mothers having a disabled 
child are more likely to participate in the labor force than single mothers, whereas Powers (2001, 2003) 
argues the opposite. Furthermore, the conclusions of existing studies are drawn from descriptive anal-
ysis. This paper adopts one-sided tests to rigorously gauge the evidence on the differential effect of 
child disability between single mothers and mothers with a partner (see, e.g. Andrews & Barwick, 2012; 
Andrews & Guggenberger, 2010; Bugni, 2010; Chernozhukov, Hong, & Tamer, 2007; Hansen, Lunde, & 
Nason, 2011; Lee, Song, & Whang, 2013; Linton, Song, & Whang, 2010; Lu, 2016; Romano, Shaikh, & 
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Wolf, 2014; Rosen, 2008 for the recent literature on one-sided tests). We also test the impact of wel-
fare payments on the labor supply of mothers of disabled children, and how the severity of child disa-
bility restricts the mothers’ labor supply. The one-sided hypothesis test approach allows us to examine 
the directional empirical evidence against the sampling error. Our main findings are:
(1)  A more severe child disability imposes greater restrictions on single mothers’ participation in 
the labor force.
(2)  Single mothers are less likely than mothers with a partner to participate in the labor force in 
the event of a child health shock.
(3)  There is some evidence of the disincentive effect of welfare payments in encouraging moth-
ers’ participation in the labor force, particularly for single mothers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the econometric tech-
niques used in our empirical studies. It includes the construction of models and applications of one-
sided hypothesis tests. Section 3 describes the data we use. Section 4 carries out the empirical 
studies and discusses the findings. Some concluding remarks are made in Section 5.
2. Econometric analysis
2.1. The models
Denote by y1 the variable for an individual mother’s labor supply and by y2 her status of being a recipi-
ent of a government welfare payment. y1 and y2 are endogenously determined. Let x be a column 
vector of exogenous variables that include the child disability variable D and are responsible for both 
mother’s labor supply and the status of receiving a government welfare payment. Let w be a column 
vector of exogenous variables that are only responsible for mothers’ labor supply. We are interested 
in estimating the marginal effect of D on y1. This effect comes from two sources. One is the direct ef-
fect of D on y1 and the other is the indirect effect of D on y1 through y2. Complications arise from the 
identification of the composite effect together with the discrete nature of y1 and y2. In this paper we 
adopt a parametric approach in which the combined direct and indirect effects of child disability on a 
mother’s labor supply are estimated. Our parametric specification allows our estimation to rely only 
on the identification of reduced form (RF) parameter not on the identification of structural parameter 
as that usually requires valid instruments (see, e.g. Millimet & Tchernis, 2013). That is, we can only 
estimate the combined direct and indirect effects, but we cannot separate them.
Let the subscript i index the ith observation (mother) from an independent and identically distrib-
uted sample of n mothers. Denote y∗1i and y
∗
2i the latent counterparts of y1i and y2i, respectively. We 
assume the model of the structural form (SF) as 
where the error term (u1, u2)
� follows the bivariate normal distribution with the zero mean and the 
covariance matrix
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where the error term (1, 2)
� is the bivariate normal random variable with the zero mean and 
 covariance matrix of
where −1 < 𝜏 < 1. Note that xi that includes child disability variable Di are part of v1i and v2i.
For the mothers’ employment status variable, y1i, and the welfare status variable, y2i, we define 
y∗ki > 0 for participating in the labor force (k = 1) or receiving a welfare payment (k = 2) and 
observe
k = 1, 2. For presentation convenience we may let ski = 2yki − 1. The log-likelihood function of the 
RF model is
where  = (�1, 
�
2, )
� and Φ2(⋅, ⋅;) is the cumulative distribution function of the bivariate standard 
normal random variable with the correlation .
The effects of the child disability variables on the labor supply can be identified based on the RF 
parameter. They, hence, avoid the potential identification problem of the SF parameter. For BiProbit 
models the probability of the ith mother participating in the labor force conditional on the status of 
receiving a welfare payment (s2 or y2) is
Because our child disability variables are more than one dummy variable, with the value 1 indicat-
ing the child disability being in a particular category of severity, the effect of a particular child disabil-
ity variable, Dq, q = 1,…Q, on mi is defined as
and the average effect is estimated as
As all the conditional effects m are highly nonlinear functions of , we estimate the covariance of 
Δm̂ through a bootstrap procedure in which we randomly draw a number of samples of size n with 
replacements from the original sample and estimate Δm̂q, q = 1,…Q, according to (2.8) for each 
random sample.
2.2. Tests of directional effects
Suppose we wish to examine whether child disability decreases the probability of work by single 
mothers more than that for mothers with a partner conditional on the status of receiving a welfare 
payment. That is, to test hq = Δpmq(s2) − Δsmq(s2) ≥ 0, q = 1,… ,Q, where 







(2.4)yki = 1 ify
∗
ki > 0,
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partner and single mothers, respectively. Two-sided tests do not take into account the nature of 
one-sided restrictions. Consequently, their powers may be compromised. Therefore, it is more ap-
propriate to carry out one-sided tests of directional effects. There are different formulations of one-
sided hypotheses under different assumptions. For example, the researcher may be willing to 
assume the impact of child disability on the probability to work for partnered mothers cannot be 
more negative than that for single mothers and seek evidence on whether child disability decreases 
the probability to work for single mothers more than that for mothers with a partner. Then we could 
adopt EMaxT tests of Lu (2016) for simultaneously testing of the multiple hypotheses,
and the global hypotheses
with the control of the familywise error rate (FWE) for the multiple hypothesis tests (see, e.g. Romano 
& Wolf, 2005a, 2005b; Romano, Shaikh, & Wolf, 2010 for discussions of multiple tests). EMaxT tests 
are motivated for improving the global power of existing MaxT tests at some (sometime little) cost 
of the multiple testing power. EMaxT tests have been shown that they can have considerable global 
power improvement over MaxT tests, and are more robust against the normality assumption than 
likelihood ratio (LR) tests in global testing.
Let h = (h1,… ,hQ)
�. Assume
where Σ̂ is a consistent estimate of Σ, Σ̂1∕2 is the matrix such that Σ̂1∕2Σ̂1∕2 = Σ̂, I is the identity ma-
trix and d
���→
 denotes the convergence in distribution. We further assume that ĥ is studentized and Σ̂ 
is the estimated correlation matrix (see Romano & Wolf, 2005b for rationales of studentization for 
constructing MaxT tests). EMaxT tests have the test statistic as
where b̂ ∈ {b̂ ∈ RQ:b̂�Σ̂−1b̂ = 1} is computed by Algorithm 1 in Lu (2016) using Σ̂. Denote by c
,E the 
critical value such that Prh=0(TE > c𝛼,E) = 𝛼. In global testing H is rejected if TE > c𝛼,E. In multiple 
testing Hq, q ∈ , is rejected if n
1
2 ĥq > c𝛼,E. c,E or p -value can be approximated by the Monte Carlo 
procedure stated in Algorithm 2 of Lu (2016) or analytically computed by Equation (12) of Lu (2016) 
in the case of Q = 2.
For a robustness check on testing results we also consider conventional MaxT tests, LR tests and 
the one-sided Wald tests of Andrews (1998). MaxT tests are implemented with the test statistic
Denote by c
,M the critical value such that Prh=0(TM > c𝛼,M) = 𝛼. In the global testing H is rejected 
if TM > c𝛼,M. In multiple testing Hq, q ∈ , is rejected if n
1
2 ĥq > c𝛼,M. Note that generally the use of 
c
,M computed under h = 0 leads to the weak control of FWE (see, e.g. Dudoit, Shaffer, & Boldrick, 
2003; Romano & Wolf, 2005a). The strong control of FWE demands the control of FWE under any 
combination of true and false null hypotheses, i.e. hq = 0, q ∈ , ∀ ⊆ . If one is willing to assume 
that the distribution of individual p-values for testing Hq is uniformly distributed on (0, 1) under 
hq = 0, then following Romano and Wolf (2005a) MaxT tests using c,M ensure the strong control of 
FWE in the individual test of Hq, q ∈ . Because c𝛼,E > c𝛼,M as shown in Lu (2016) it follows that our 
EMaxT tests also have the strong control of FWE in individual hypothesis testing.
(2.9)Hq:hq = 0 vs. H
a
q:hq > 0, q ∈  = {1,… ,Q},
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LR tests are implemented with the test statistic (see, e.g. Wolak, 1989a, 1989b),
The limiting null distribution of TL1 is the so-called chi-bar-square (
2) distribution, which is a mix-




j , where 
2
0 has a mass of 1 at 0 and 
(Q, j,Σ) is the mixing probability of having j positive elements out of Q in the solution to the quad-
ratic programming problem in (2.11) (see, e.g. Wolak, 1987). The p-value can be computed as
The one-sided Wald tests of Andrews (1998) are implemented with the test statistic
where Φ(B,h,Σ) = Pr(U ∈ B), U ∼ N(h,Σ) and B = {h ≥ 0}. We follow Andrews’ suggestion of sim-
ulating the null distribution by U�0U0 + 2 logΦ(B, Σ̂
1∕2U0, Σ̂), where U0 ∼ N(0, I).
The hypothesis settings (2.9) and (2.10) become inappropriate if the assumption that h ≤ 0 can-
not occur is violated. For example, the researcher may argue that child disability of some degrees of 
severity has higher negative impacts on single mothers than mothers with a partner, while child 
disability of other degrees of severity has lower negative impacts on single mothers than mothers 
with a partner. If one cannot assume a priori knowledge of that it can only be possible that h ≥ 0, 
then the hypotheses (2.9) and (2.10) should be re-formulated as
and




Let Q∗ be the number of non-negative elements in h0 and ΣQ∗ is the covariance of associated esti-
mate. Q∗ can be consistently estimated by the dimension of 
ĥ∗ = (h1,… ,hQ∗ )
� = {ĥq:ĥq ≥ −(bn∕n)
−1∕2,q = 1,… ,Q}, where bn is a sequence satisfying
Choices of bn that satisfy (2.14) have been suggested by several authors (e.g. Andrews, 1999; 
Andrews & Soares, 2010; Donald & Hsu, 2011; Hansen, 2005; Rosen, 2008). For example, bn = logn 
in Andrews and Soares (2010) and bn = log logn in Hansen (2005). Let Σ̂
∗ be the correlation matrix 
corresponding to ĥ∗. Then implement EMaxT tests by using ĥ∗ and Σ̂∗. MaxT tests are implemented 
similarly. LR tests are implemented with the test statistic,
that has the limiting null distribution 2(Q∗) =
∑Q∗
j=0 (Q









𝜔(Q, j, Σ̂) Pr(𝜒2j > TL1).
D-W
∞
= n{ĥ�Σ̂−1ĥ + 2 logΦ(B, ĥ, Σ̂)},
(2.12)HIq:hq < 0 vs. H
I,a
q :hq > 0, q ∈ ,




(2.14)bn → ∞, bn∕n→ 0.
(2.15)TL2 = ninfh≥0(−ĥ − h)
�Σ̂−1(−ĥ − h),
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Some authors find that the choice of bn can have an influential role in the performance of one-
sided tests (e.g. Donald & Hsu, 2011). In fact, we can show that there always exists a bn that satisfies 
the condition (2.14) such that any Q∗ ∈ {1,… ,Q} can be an estimate for a given sample of size n. 
Consider bn = (logn)
a, a > 0, which can be verified satisfying the condition (2.14). Because bn is a 
monotonically increasing function of a when n ≥ 3, the dimension of Q∗ is likely to increase as a in-
creases. This effectively implies that given n any Q∗ ∈ {1,… ,Q} can be an estimate by choosing an 
appropriate a. Therefore, it is important to check the sensitivity of test results to the estimate Q∗. We 
suggest that tests be performed as follows. Order the elements of ĥ such that the first element is the 
smallest. Let ĥ = (ĥ�1, ĥ
�
2)
�, where ĥ1 < 0, ĥ2 ≥ 0 and Q̂
∗
0 be the dimension of ĥ2. Then perform tests 
at Q̂∗ = Q,Q − 1,… , Q̂∗0. The p-value can be computed as
3. Data and descriptive analysis
The data used in this paper are extracted from the Survey of Disability, Ageing and Carers 2003, 
which was the fifth comprehensive national survey conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS) to collect information on people with a disability, older people and people who care for persons 
with a disability and older people. In the survey, people were identified as having a disability if they 
had one or more of the listed limitations, restrictions or impairments which had lasted, or was likely 
to last, for a period of six months or more and restricted everyday activities. The list is provided in 
Appendix 1.
Four categories of disability status are first constructed according to the ABS definitions: pro-
foundly, severely, moderately/mildly limited and not limited in core activities. Core activities include 
self care, mobility and communication.1 The definitions for these categories of child disability are 
provided in Appendix 1.
There are 41,233 individuals with household, family and person identifiers in the survey. Of these, 
3,934 females aged from 25 to 64 years have at least one child in the household. Forty-nine of these 
females are excluded in our analysis as they indicate that their main reason for not looking for work 
is that they do not need or want to work.2 Fifty-eight females, including adult children, are omitted 
so that all of the females in our sample are either a wife/partner (including same-sex partner) in the 
household or a lone parent. This reduces the number of mothers to 3,827. Ten mothers with a pro-
found disability of their own are dropped from the sample because they are not in the labor force. As 
only one of the nine single mothers with a profound own disability is in the labor force, we exclude 
these nine single mothers from the sample. The final sample consists of 3,808 mothers, of whom 
2,800 have a partner3 and 1,008 are single mothers. We also study the labor market activities of 
mothers who do not have an own disability. There are 3,332 mothers without their own disability, of 
whom 2,511 are mothers with a partner and 821 are single mothers.
The ABS data are collected in a way that each observation is attached to a population weight. 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for both weighted and unweighted samples for the moth-
ers, including those with an own disability, while Table 2 provides these for the mothers, excluding 
those with an own disability. It shows that the results for weighted and unweighted samples are 
slightly different. Further analysis is conducted using the weighted sample.
Table 3 displays the labor force participation rates of mothers with disabled children under the 
different levels of disability severity for the mothers, including or excluding those having an own dis-
ability, respectively. The tables also include information on mothers with able children. They reveal 




𝜔(Q̂∗, Q̂∗ − j, Σ̂Q∗ ) Pr(𝜒
2
j > TL2).
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Table 1. Sample information with standard deviation in parenthesis for mothers, including 
those having an own disability
Variable Definition Sample proportion/mean
weighted unweighted
Employment 1 if in labor force, 0 otherwise 0.663 0.671
Hourswk Hours worked per week 25.562 (14.201) 25.453 (14.148)
Welfare 1 if the mother receives a welfare payment, 
0 otherwise
0.323 0.334
ChildDisis1 1 if the child disability is profoundly limited in 
core activities, 0 otherwise
0.033 0.034
ChildDisis2 1 if the child disability is severely limited in 
core activities, 0 otherwise
0.037 0.036
ChildDisis3 1 if the child disability is moderately/mildly 
limited in core activities, 0 otherwise
0.022 0.021
ChildDisis4 1 if the child disability is not limited in core 
activities, 0 otherwise
0.038 0.040
Age Age of the observation minus 45 −7.770 (6.567) −7.513 (6.476)
Degree 1 if the highest education is degree or above, 
0 otherwise
0.221 0.219
Diploma 1 if the highest education is certificate, 
diploma or advanced diploma, 0 otherwise
0.289 0.280
Year12 1 if the highest education is year 12, 0 
otherwise
0.164 0.164
IncomeMis 1 if income gap (unit income minus personal 
income) is not available, 0 otherwise
0.196 0.188
LnIncome Natural log of income that is unit income 
minus
4.534 4.558
Personal income and is set as 0 if it is 
missing
2.878 2.856
Ykidage Age of the youngest dependent child 6.100 (4.268) 6.238 (4.268)
NoChildren Number of children under 15 in the family 1.869 (0.857) 1.866 (0.859)
OwnDis1 1 if own disability is severely limited in core 
activities, 0 otherwise
0.022 0.025
OwnDis2 1 if own disability is moderately/mildly 
limited in core activities, 0 otherwise
0.049 0.053
OwnDis3 1 if own disability is not limited in core 
activities, 0 otherwise
0.046 0.047
NoPersonWel Number of persons in the household other 
than mother and partner receiving welfare 
payments
0.112 (0.421) 0.112 (0.426)
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status and mothers’ labor market activity. It appears that for mothers of profoundly or severely disa-
bled children (ChildDis1 and ChildDis2) their labor force participation rates are lower than for moth-
ers with able children and they become even lower as the severity of child disability worsens except 
for mothers with a partner who have an own disability and receive welfare. The evidence is less clear 
for mothers of disabled children who do not have a profound or severe limitation (ChildDis3 and 
ChildDis4). For mothers with a partner who do not receive welfare and have a disabled child whose 
disability is not limited in core activities (ChildDis4), their labor force participation rate is even greater 
than that of mothers of able children. Comparing mothers with a partner with single mothers shows 
Table 2. Sample information with standard deviation in parenthesis for mothers, excluding 
those having an own disability
Variable Definition Sample proportion/mean
weighted unweighted
Employment 1 if in labor force, 0 otherwise 0.679 0.688
Hourswk Hours worked per week 25.658 (14.069) 25.544 (14.015)
Welfare 1 if the observation receives any government 
welfare benefit payment, 0 otherwise
0.303 0.313
ChildDisis1 1 if the child disability is profoundly limited in 
core activities, 0 otherwise
0.028 0.029
ChildDisis2 1 if the child disability is severely limited in 
core activities, 0 otherwise
0.029 0.029
ChildDisis3 1 if the child disability is moderately/mildly 
limited in core activities, 0 otherwise
0.020 0.019
ChildDisis4 1 if the child disability is not limited in core 
activities, 0 otherwise
0.033 0.034
Age Age of the observation minus 45 −7.903 (6.516) −7.629 (6.430)
Degree 1 if the highest education is degree or above, 
0 otherwise
0.226 0.226
Diploma 1 if the highest education is certificate, 
diploma or advanced diploma, 0 otherwise
0.285 0.276
Year12 1 if the highest education is year 12, 0 
otherwise
0.170 0.170
IncomeMis 1 if income gap (unit income minus personal 
income) is not available, 0 otherwise
0.197 0.191
LnIncome Natural log of income that is unit income 
minus personal income and is set as 0 if it is 
missing
4.590 (2.878) 4.608 (2.863)
Ykidage Age of the youngest dependent child 5.959 6.109
−4.250 −4.256
NoChildren Number of children under 15 in the family 1.878 (0.854) 1.875 (0.852)
NoPersonWel Number of persons in the household other 
than mother and partner receiving welfare 
payments
0.101 (0.409) 0.101 (0.413)
Page 10 of 20
Li et al., Cogent Economics & Finance (2017), 5: 1339769
https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2017.1339769
that child disability has higher negative impacts on single mothers than mothers with a partner. 
Looking across the status of welfare payments for single mothers and mothers with a partner, the 
tables reveal that mothers are less likely to participate in the labor force if they receive welfare pay-
ments. This is true regardless of whether their children have a disability or not. However, such a 
disincentive effect appears to dampen as the severity of child disability worsens; the difference in 
labor force participation rates between those receiving and those not receiving a welfare payment 
decreases as the severity of child disability worsens.
Table 3. Employment for mothers including and excluding those having an own disability
ChildDis1 ChildDis2 ChildDis3 ChildDis4 able children
Mothers including those having an own disability
Mothers with a partner receiving welfare
In labor force 31 17 9 17 243
Not in labor force 39 23 12 10 265
Participation rate 44 43 42 62 48
Mothers with a partner not receiving welfare
In labor force 10 32 21 51 1488
Not in labor force 8 14 9 15 487
Participation rate 57 70 71 77 75
Single mothers receiving welfare
In labor force 8 12 13 15 248
Not in labor force 23 28 11 20 230
Participation rate 27 30 54 43 52
Single mothers not receiving welfare
In labor force 5 9 6 11 266
Not in labor force 6 6 4 4 82
Participation rate 44 59 62 72 76
Mothers excluding those having an own disability
Mothers with a partner receiving welfare
In labor force 23 12 6 16 216
Not in labor force 29 17 10 6 232
Participation rate 44 41 39 72 48
Mothers with a partner not receiving welfare
In labor force 9 22 19 46 1376
Not in labor force 4 13 7 8 441
Participation rate 66 63 74 85 76
Single mothers receiving welfare
In labor force 5 10 9 12 207
Not in labor force 19 15 8 13 182
Participation rate 20 41 55 46 53
Single mothers not receiving welfare
In labor force 4 8 5 9 242
Not in labor force 3 3 3 2 65
Participation rate 52 73 63 81 79
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4. The results of estimation and testing
Our BiProbit estimates take into account the population weights of sample observations. Our weight-
ed BiProbit estimates are obtained by adjusting the log-likelihood functions as lw() =
∑n
i=1wili(), 
where wi is the weight associated with the ith observation, 
∑n
i=1wi = n and li() the log-likelihood 
function for the ith observation, which is the summand in Equation (2.6). The average treatment ef-
fect such as in Equation (2.8) is adjusted by the weighted sample average, for example, 
Δm̂q = n
−1∑n
i wiΔmi,q(?̂?). The random draws in the bootstrap procedure are implemented accord-
ing to the sample weight.
Tables 4 and 5 report the estimated RF models of BiProbit models for the group of mothers having 
or not having an own disability. The reported standard errors of estimates are obtained through the 
bootstrap procedure in which 1000 samples through random sampling with replacement are used. 
Note that we initially estimated models with the child disability variables ChildDis3 and ChildDis4 as 
two separate variables, but found their associated coefficient estimates are highly insignificant. The 
reported results are based on amalgamating ChildDis3 and ChildDis4 (denoted as ChildDis34). The 
estimated correlation coefficients  are significant suggesting a correlation of mothers’ employment 
and the welfare variable. The sign of estimate of coefficients associated with the child disability 
(ChildDis1, ChildDis2 and ChildDis34) confirms that child disability has a negative effect on mothers’ 
labor supply, but a positive effect on the probability of their being a welfare payment recipient. Note 
that the sign of estimate of coefficients associated with severe child disability (ChildDis2) on single 
mothers’ welfare payment is negative, but insignificant.
Table 4. Estimates of the RF of BiProbit models for mothers, including those having an own 
disability
Mothers with a partner Single mothers
Work decision Welfare Work decision Welfare
Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err
Constant −0.01 0.21 −0.14 0.21 −0.50 0.24 1.29 0.25
ChildDis1 −0.46 0.15 1.52 0.17 −0.63 0.25 0.32 0.25
ChildDis2 −0.22 0.18 0.65 0.16 −0.43 0.23 0.02 0.22
ChildDis34 −0.07 0.12 0.34 0.13 −0.13 0.18 0.20 0.18
Age −0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 −0.02 0.02 −0.02 0.02
Age-
square
−3 × 10−3 1 × 10−3 2 × 10−4 5 × 10−4 −5 × 10−4 9 × 10−4 −2 × 10−3 9 × 10−4
Degree 0.58 0.09 −0.57 0.09 1.06 0.16 −0.74 0.15
Diploma 0.41 0.07 −0.09 0.08 0.46 0.11 −0.13 0.11
Year12 0.26 0.08 −0.11 0.09 0.29 0.14 −0.29 0.14
IncomeMis −0.40 0.19 −0.63 0.17 −0.18 0.16 −1.40 0.17
LnIncome 0.02 0.03 −0.09 0.02 0.04 0.02 −0.23 0.03
YChildAge 0.11 0.01 −0.05 0.01 0.10 0.02 −0.03 0.01
No.
Children
−0.18 0.03 0.13 0.04 −0.13 0.06 0.13 0.06
No.
PersonWel
−0.41 0.07 0.24 0.08 −0.31 0.11 0.08 0.10
OwnDis1 −0.72 0.22 0.59 0.18 −1.17 0.43 −0.01 0.29
OwnDis2 −0.64 0.16 0.20 0.16 −0.64 0.19 0.56 0.19
OwnDis3 0.23 0.15 0.15 0.15 −0.14 0.19 0.04 0.20
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Examining the effects of other variables, whether income information is missing (IncomeMis) is 
found to be non-trivial in accounting for mothers’ labor supply and their status of receiving a welfare 
payment. Mothers who do not provide their income information are less likely to participate in the 
labor force, as well as being less likely to receive government welfare payments. The evidence ap-
pears to be stronger for mothers with a partner than for single mothers. For those who do report 
family income information the income effects are positive on mothers’ labor supply, but negative on 
mothers receiving welfare across all groups of mothers.5 In relation to education attainment it ap-
pears that the better educated mothers are more likely to work and they are less likely to be welfare 
recipients. Signs of the estimates of the coefficients associated with other child variables (YChildAge 
and No.Children) are generally as expected; as the age of the youngest child increases or the number 
of children decreases the mother is more likely to work while they are less likely to receive govern-
ment welfare payments. Mother’s age appears to be trivial in determining their labor supply and 
their status of receiving welfare payments.6 Other control variables such as location of mother and 
age of child are not found to be significant and so are not reported here.
Table 6 reports the estimated marginal effects of child disability on the probability of working 
(Δm) conditional upon receiving a government welfare payment or not (s2). The results show that 
single mothers are less likely to work if they have a disabled child and work even less if the severity 
of child disability increases regardless of whether they receive a government welfare payment or 
not. However, this may not be true for mothers with a partner. Partnered mothers may work even 
more if they have a moderately/mildly or non-core activity limited disabled child (ChildDis34) as 
observed in the descriptive statistics analysis. To gauge evidence on this observation, we carry out 
hypothesis testing. Let q = 1, 2, 3 correspond to ChildDis1, ChildDis2 and ChildDis34, respectively, 
and the hypotheses be
Table 5. Estimates of the RF of BiProbit models for mothers, excluding those having an own 
disability
Mothers with a partner Single mothers
Work decision Welfare Work decision Welfare
Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err.
Constant −0.02 0.05 −0.17 0.04 −0.67 0.07 1.03 0.08
ChildDisis1 −0.53 0.03 1.64 0.05 −0.92 0.09 0.58 0.07
ChildDisis2 −0.40 0.03 0.66 0.03 −0.23 0.08 −0.07 0.08
ChildDi-
sis34
0.05 0.02 0.37 0.02 −0.17 0.04 0.26 0.05
Age −0.05 1 × 10−4 3 × 10−3 1 × 10−4 −0.03 4 × 10−4 −0.04 3 × 10−4
Age-
square
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 × 10−4 1 × 10−6
Degree 0.54 0.01 −0.54 0.01 1.14 0.03 −0.76 0.02
Diploma 0.38 0.01 −0.08 0.01 0.49 0.02 −0.18 0.02
Year12 0.24 0.01 −0.07 0.01 0.21 0.02 −0.37 0.03
IncomeMis −0.41 0.03 −0.55 0.03 −0.09 0.03 −1.60 0.04
LnIncome 0.02 0.00 −0.09 0.00 0.06 0.00 −0.24 0.00
YChildAge 0.12 0.00 −0.05 0.00 0.12 0.00 −0.03 0.00
No.
Children
−0.19 0.00 0.13 0.00 −0.18 0.00 0.20 0.00
No.
PersonWel
−0.41 0.01 0.22 0.01 −0.27 0.01 0.29 0.01
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and
with at least one inequality holding under H

. Apply the transformation h = RΔm, where 
Δm = (Δm1,Δm2,Δm3)
� and
H0: Δm1 = Δm2 = Δm3
H

: Δm1 ≤ Δm2 ≤ Δm3 ≤ 0
H0: Δm1 ≥ Δm2 ≥ Δm3 ≥ 0
H









Table 6. Estimated marginal effects of child disability on the probability to work with the 
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we have h1 = −Δm1 + Δm2 and h2 = −Δm2 + Δm3 and conduct global and multiple tests of the 
hypotheses (2.9), (2.10, (2.12) and (2.13) as discussed in Section .
Tables 7–10 report the p-values of EMaxT, MaxT, LR and D-W
∞
 tests. We also report the p-values 
of usual Wald tests for two-sided tests for comparison. Note that under the hypotheses (2.12) and 
(2.13) EMaxT and MaxT tests collapse to univariate t tests when Q∗ = 1. Also, the results for EMaxT 
tests under the heading “He” representing the p-values for the component statistic n
1
2 b̂�Σ̂−1ĥ and 
that under the heading of “H∗q” represent the ordered hypotheses with H
∗
1 corresponding to the 
smallest p-value. The minimum p -value over all components is the p-value for global testing of the 
hypotheses (2.10) and (2.13). The results of EMaxT, LR and D- W
∞
 tests clearly show the strong 
evidence on the severity effect of child disability for single mothers regardless of whether they have 
an own disability or not. There is some evidence for mothers with a partner who do not have an own 
disability as revealed in Tables 9 and 10. The evidence becomes more significant for testing the 
hypotheses (2.13) which indicates some child disability in particular contributing to the evidence. 



































Proposition: More severe child disability has higher negative impacts on mothers’ employment
Mothers with a partner conditional on receiving welfare
0.508 0.856 0.834 0.980 0.849 0.824 0.980 0.277 0.180 0.767
Mothers with a partner conditional on not receiving welfare
0.471 0.917 0.814 0.938 0.915 0.802 0.938 0.274 0.168 0.756
Single mothers conditional on receiving welfare
0.004 0.787 0.277 0.760 0.772 0.238 0.742 0.002 0.001 0.013
Single mothers conditional on not receiving welfare
0.016 0.812 0.269 0.791 0.804 0.234 0.780 0.008 0.004 0.045
Proposition: Child disability has higher negative impacts on single mothers than mothers with a partner
Conditional on receiving welfare
0.435 0.192 0.257 0.669 0.182 0.247 0.667 0.115 0.068 0.278
Conditional on not receiving welfare
0.187 0.242 0.319 0.748 0.231 0.310 0.748 0.167 0.100 0.380
Proposition: Child disability has higher negative impacts on mothers receiving welfare than mothers not receiving 
welfare
Mothers with a partner
0.974 0.454 0.994 0.994 0.449 0.994 0.994 0.461 0.682 0.403
Single mothers
0.123 0.438 0.229 0.459 0.431 0.218 0.452 0.151 0.077 0.353
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The p-values of EMaxT and MaxT tests suggest that the component ĥ1 = −Δm̂1 + Δm̂2 contributes 
most to the evidence for single mothers and ĥ2 = −Δm̂2 + Δm̂3 for partnered mothers who do not 
have an own disability.
Next we examine whether child disability has higher negative impacts on single mothers than 
mothers with a partner. The estimated results reported in Table 6 appear to suggest so; 
hq = Δpmq − Δsmq > 0, q = 1, 2, 3, for both the probabilities conditional on receiving or not receiv-
ing a welfare payment. The test results under the hypotheses (2.9), (2.10), (2.12) and (2.13) reported 
in the middle part of Tables 7–10 show some evidence particularly for mothers who do not have an 
own disability, but who receive welfare payments. The results of EmaxT and MaxT tests suggest that 
the profound child disability (ĥ1 = Δpm̂1 − Δsm̂1) contributes most to the evidence.











































Proposition: More severe child disability has higher negative impacts on mothers’ employment
Mothers with a partner conditional on receiving welfare
0.432 0.681 0.657 0.668 0.641 0.547 0.339
Mothers with a partner conditional on not receiving welfare
0.532
Single mothers conditional on receiving welfare
0.006
Single mothers conditional on not receiving welfare
0.021
Proposition: Child disability has higher negative impacts on single mothers than mothers with a partner
Conditional on receiving welfare
0.102
Conditional on not receiving welfare
0.149
Proposition: Child disability has higher negative impacts on mothers receiving welfare than mothers not receiving 
welfare
Mothers with a partner
0.778 0.974 0.347 0.974 0.336 0.188 0.477 0.350 0.217
Single mothers
0.137
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Last we examine the disincentive effect of welfare payment. As reported in Table 6, the difference 
between those receiving and not receiving welfare payments (hq = Δmq(−1) − Δmq(1), q = 1, 2, 3) 
shows that single mothers receiving welfare are slightly less likely to work than single mothers not 
receiving welfare. The test results under the hypotheses (2.9), (2.10), (2.12) and (2.13) are reported 
in the bottom part of Tables 7–10. The results suggest some statistical evidence for single mothers, 
particularly by Andrews’ D-W
∞
 tests. For mothers with a partner all EMaxT, MaxT, LR and D-W
∞
 tests 
suggest that there is no significant statistical evidence on such a welfare effect. However, t tests and 
LR tests under the one-sided hypotheses (2.12) and (2.13) reveal some evidence that profound child 
disability has higher negative impacts on partnered mothers receiving welfare than partnered moth-
ers not receiving welfare; partnered mothers having a profoundly disabled child are less likely to 
work if they receive government welfare payments.



































Proposition: More severe child disability has higher negative impacts on mothers’ employment
Mothers with a partner conditional on receiving welfare
0.358 0.989 0.116 1.000 0.989 0.094 1.000 0.060 0.071 0.151
Mothers with a partner conditional on not receiving welfare
0.431 0.997 0.139 1.000 0.997 0.114 1.000 0.078 0.094 0.216
Single mothers conditional on receiving welfare
0.001 0.149 0.852 0.686 0.122 0.843 0.656 0.000 0.000 0.004
Single mothers conditional on not receiving welfare
0.013 0.202 0.806 0.742 0.172 0.797 0.726 0.009 0.005 0.047
Proposition: Child disability has higher negative impacts on single mothers than mothers with a partner
Conditional on receiving welfare
0.130 0.075 0.887 0.282 0.068 0.887 0.272 0.061 0.053 0.162
Conditional on not receiving welfare
0.239 0.133 0.917 0.396 0.123 0.917 0.388 0.122 0.102 0.290
Proposition: Child disability has higher negative impacts on mothers receiving welfare than mothers not receiving 
welfare
Mothers with a partner
0.937 0.239 0.888 1.000 0.229 0.888 1.000 0.228 0.432 0.101
Single mothers
0.182 0.529 0.482 0.341 0.524 0.475 0.330 0.220 0.111 0.485
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5. Conclusion
This paper constructs parametric models for estimating the effect of child disability on mothers’ la-
bor supply. We allow welfare payments to mothers to be endogenously determined with mothers’ 
labor supply, as well as allowing child disability to account for both labor supply and welfare pay-
ment. One-sided hypothesis tests are adopted to gauge statistical evidence on several propositions 
that have policy relevance. Unlike past studies where welfare is treated as an exogenous variable, 
this paper looks at the endogeneity of welfare payments. We find that child disability restricts moth-
ers’ employment opportunities, while it increases the chances of mothers being welfare recipients.
The data we use in this study come from the survey that has a particular aim to collect information 
on people with a disability. Severity levels of child disability in the survey data are assessed by trained 
interviewers. This is in contrast to studies reported in the literature in which the lack of information 
concerning the measurement of child disability results in complications such as endogeneity due to 
self-reporting. Our data enable us to find evidence that more severe child disability has higher nega-
tive impacts on single mothers’ employment. Furthermore, this paper takes into account the disin-
centive effect of government welfare support relating to the impact of child disability on the mother’s 
labor supply. We also rigorously examine the differential effect of child disability on single mothers 
and mothers with a partner. Our study reveals some evidence suggesting child disability has a higher 
negative impact on single mothers than mothers with a partner. Our study also reveals some evi-
dence on the disincentive effect of welfare payments for single mothers, as well as mothers with a 
partner if their child’s disability is severe.











































Proposition: More severe child disability has higher negative impacts on mothers’ employment
Mothers with a partner conditional on receiving welfare
0.070 0.899 0.085 0.899 0.064 0.032 0.082 0.036 0.000
Mothers with a partner conditional on not receiving welfare
0.115 0.949 0.102 0.949 0.077 0.039 0.119 0.056 0.000
Single mothers conditional on receiving welfare
0.002
Single mothers conditional on not receiving welfare
0.022
Proposition: Child disability has higher negative impacts on single mothers than mothers with a partner
Conditional on receiving welfare
0.033 0.204 0.053 0.191 0.046 0.056 0.030
Conditional on not receiving welfare
0.073 0.291 0.094 0.280 0.084 0.113 0.066
Proposition: Child disability has higher negative impacts on mothers receiving welfare than mothers not receiving 
welfare
Mothers with a partner
0.371 0.784 0.174 0.784 0.162 0.087 0.267 0.178 0.032
Single mothers
0.210
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Notes
1. Self care includes bathing or showering, dressing, eating, 
toileting and bladder or bowel control; mobility includes 
moving about the usual place of residence, getting into 
or out of a bed or chair, and going to or getting around a 
place away from the usual residence; and communica-
tion includes understanding and being understood by 
strangers, family and friends.
2. These people chose this reason for not working from the 
list that includes another eleven reasons: Not applicable; 
Retired; Study or returning to study; Own ill health or 
disability; Child care availability or children too young or 
prefers to look after them; Too old; Someone else’s ill 
health or disability; Other family considerations; Preg-
nancy; Lack of relevant schooling, training or experience; 
Don’t know; Other. So we exclude them from the sample 
on the assumption that this is a group of females who 
simply do not need or want to work and their absence 
from work is irrelevant to the health status of their own 
or other family members.
3. In this paper the word “partner” includes wife, husband, 
partner, same-sex partner.
4. The ABS data information on welfare payment is 
whether an individual receives any welfare payment and 
does not distinguish different types of payment.
5. Family income does not include mother’s own income 
to reduce endogeneity concerns.
6. In the literature individual age is often found significant-
ly responsible for his/her labor supply (cf. Zhang, Inder, 
& Zhang, 2015).
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Appendix 1
Definitions of child disability
The data used in the paper are extracted from the Survey of Disability, Ageing and Carers 2003 in 
which persons were identified as having a disability if they had one or more of the limitations, re-
strictions or impairments (listed below) which had lasted, or was likely to last, for a period of six 
months or more and restricted everyday activities.
•  Loss of sight (not corrected by glasses or contact lenses);
•  Loss of hearing where communication is restricted or an aid to assist with, or substitute for, 
hearing is used;
•  Speech difficulties;
•  Chronic or recurrent pain or discomfort that restricts everyday activities;
•  Shortness of breath or breathing difficulties that restrict everyday activities;
•  Blackouts, fits or loss of consciousness;
•  Difficulty learning or understanding;
•  Incomplete use of arms or fingers;
•  Difficulty gripping or holding things;
•  Incomplete use of feet or legs;
•  A nervous or emotional condition that restricts everyday activities;
•  Restriction in physical activities or physical work;
•  Disfigurement or deformity;
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•  Mental illness or condition requiring help or supervision;
•  Long-term effects of head injury, stroke or other brain damage that restricts everyday 
activities;
•  Receiving treatment or medication for any other long-term conditions or ailments and still re-
stricted in everyday activities; or
•  Any other long-term condition that restricts everyday activities.
Classifications of severity of child disability
•  Profound: unable to do, or always needs help with, a core activity task;
•  Severe: sometimes needing assistance to perform a core activity, has difficulty understanding or 
being understood by family or friends, can communicate more easily using sign language or 
other non-spoken forms of communication;
•  Moderate: not needing assistance, but having difficulty performing a core activity; and
•  Mild: needing no assistance and having no difficulty performing a core activity, but uses aids or 
equipment because of disability, cannot easily walk 200  m, cannot walk up and down stairs 
without a handrail, cannot easily bend to pick up and object from the floor, cannot use public 
transport, can use public transport but needs help or supervision, needs no help or supervision 
but has difficulty using public transport;
•  Not limited: not limited in core activities, but may have school or employment restrictions. 
